Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1945

Toward a Liberal Legal Education
Jerome Hall
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Legal Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Hall, Jerome, "Toward a Liberal Legal Education" (1945). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 1413.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1413

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

TOWARD A LIBERAL LEGAL EDUCATION
Jerome Hal?"
I.
Imagination is the central need of legal, as of all, education. This
is not recent discovery, but old, enduring insight which needs to be
recaptured ever and again, and applied courageously. For imagination, however ineptly we may struggle to define it, is an exercise of
creative energy that is the potential resource of every genuine student, young or mature. It is the precious link that binds disparate
facts and ideas into comprehensible unity. It favors neither bare abstraction nor any mere grubbing for fact. Imagination functions, on
the contrary, as the wedding of the speculative mind to the closest,
most persistent study of the facts possible.
Before proceeding to analyze the meaning of these statements in
terms of liberal legal education, it will be helpful if we select a simple
standard of evaluation of legal education that is generally acceptable,
and we should try, also, to place present discussions of legal education
in a correct perspective. Such a measure of the quality of prevailing
legal education is implied in pointing, not at Holmes, but at the typical practitioner. For present purposes, we need not stress his many
solid virtues, but it is important to note that for various reasons, not
all of them rational ones, law schools are especially handicapped by
the deficiencies of their graduates. For the place of lawyers in the
public esteem inevitably colors the judgment of those upon whose
assistance the provision of adequate facilities depends, as, indeed, it
limits the horizon of legal educators, themselves. There is little that
can be done very quickly in remove the irrational ,influences on the
public attitude toward lawyers. But it should help to do what can be
done with curricula and methods if we keep the practicing lawyer
always and directly in view. So long as he is [regarded as] an artisan,
helpful only in an emergency, and shrewd but not scrupulous in
getting the desired results, we may take it as axiomatic that his intellectual parent, the law school, will share in this appraisal-it will
be treated as a vocational training center. So long as he is considered
the tool of large corporate interests,' the schools that nurtured him
Ph. B., 1922; J. D., 1922, University of Chicago; Jur. Se. D., 1935, Columbia
University; S. J. D., 1935, Harvard Univer f v. Author, THEMT. LAW AN SOCIETY,
19.5; ri,%wDs IN JvrISPpJzm: cE, 193-8. Professor of Law, Indiana U~iversiy,
Zi41,o 1939.
1 See what a former President of the American Bar Assocatou has recently
said on th s: Armstrong, Th' American Lawyar--1,etrospect and Prospect (1944),
ls Tenn. L. P11v. 367 at 373.
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will be held in pari delicti--and not without justice. Disconcerting
as this may be to scholars who, no less than any other, have broadened
and deepened the boundaries of human knowledge, there will, nonetheless, be no great advance in postwar legal education until the
shortcomings of the practitioner are recognized, and the law schools'
obligation admitted.
No one familiar with the progress in legal education, especially in
the past fifteen years, would deny that there are many scholars who
teach their subjects liberally, in the best sense of that word, or that
many improvements have been made by a goodly number of schools.
Evaluation must deal with the entire field of legal education and with
law schools generally. Recognition of many deficiencies of legal edu-,
cation has been represented for twenty-five years in an outpouring of
criticism, uneven in quality but, on the whole, stimulating and constructive. Opinion differs as to results achieved. Some see little more
than a continuing scrap-bag. of disconnected courses, patched here
and there by minor alterations. The optimistic think the needs adequately met. Whatever view is taken, it must be recognized that legal
education has changed in subject-matter, in diversity of method, in
broadening of objectives. But there are times when piece-meal reforms fall short of the felt needs. There are times that summon educators to criticism of the entire field, that call for a rational ordering
of the total enterprise, for clear expression of objectives and methods,
and for thorough-going valuation of the end-product. In universities and colleges the country over, scholars are now debating the
nature of liberal education, basic general education, vocational and
terminal training, education in a democracy, the place of philosophy
in such instruction, and many other fundamental questions. The current criticism of legal education is part of that broad movement. But
if we wish to advance beyond vague and ineffective agreement concerning objectives, we must analyze the needs of legal education
much more carefully than has been done in the largest part. of the
extant literature.
It would seem to be a mere truism in any discussion of legal education, that one cannot become a lawyer without acquiring a knowledge of the rules of law that comprise the legal system. This is
generally assumed but, occasionally, well motivated reforms are recommended that seem to overlook this entirely; hence it becomes easier
for any proponent of liberal legal education to be misunderstood. 'A
person may be a logician, a social scientist, and an axiologist, but this
does not make him a lawyer-as Coke told James. This is important
to recognize because otherwise we encourage the notion that legality

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[VOL 30

is insignificant or, even, harmful. It is elementary because it is plain
that much of the contents of any advanced legal system is distinctive,
complex, and not discoverable by unspecialized good sense--certainly not in the degree of precision needed in a modern civilization.
The cause of sound legal education will hardly be advanced by advocacy that ignores such primary concerns. It may, accordingly, be
hoped that what follows will not be misconstrued as a substitute for
legal education, but will be understood as relevant only to the questions, -what is the best legal education, and how can it be provided?
Liberal legal education implies that the study of law shall be imaginatively integrated in the life of the future practitioner. It bespeaks
a concern for the whole intellectual, moral man, for the whole lawyer
-for the lawyer is inseparable from the man. It is, accordingly, the
premise of this paper that the law schools have not taught law as
imaginatively as.they might have; that the central purpose of postwar
legal education should be to teach law imaginatively, and to provide
conditions that encourage, indeed require, law to be studied imaginatively. The merits of, and need for, liberal legal education do not
depend on the assumption that the postwar world will be radically
different from the present one. They rest on its superiority under any
conditions. Hence the implicit injunction is that educators must oppose the view that the Bar is inevitably the mlere product of economic
conditions. For present-day legal scholars, the chief problem is not
-whatthe postwar era will do to lawyers and legal education, but what
that education can and should do for lawyers of the -postwar period.
II.
In discussing the teaching and study of law, it is worth remembering from the outset that we speak of a relationship between mature
persons and the youth. Socrates said about all of the most important
things that can be said concerning education in this relationship. In
the endless search for learning, the major question is, how can one
be brought to understand what he does not already know? We need
not accept Socrates" theory of innate ideas that can be recalled into
consciousness, as the basis of our procedure. His enduring contribution was to place the emphasis where it belongs, and thus to suggest
the paramount role of imagination in any person's education.
The imaginative study of law designates the most fundamental sort
of thinking in and concerning law, the kind of thinking that is represented in science and philosophy. This does not mean that every law
teacher must be a teacher of jurisprudence. What is needed is a
scientific and philosophic teaching (and study) of the various courses
in the curriculum so as not only to plumb each course thoroughly but,
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also, to bring the separate courses into a unity, to make it possible
"to see the law steadily and see it whole." Let us consider what these
generalizations involve.
The subject-matter of "law" includes thousands of rules found in
constitutions, statutes, cases and regulations, together with the infinitely greater number of rules that are implied presently and potentially in the interrelationships of those already expressed. The study
of law must therefore include the acquisition of knowledge of these
rules, and this means, also, of the methQds employed to discover them
and to determine their meanings. It must, in addition, include the
acquisition of knowledge of the application of the rules--and this is
much broader than their administration by officials. Rules of law
have been talked about in various ways, but the fashion has been to
think of law as consisting of abstractions. It is clear, however, that
while rules of law are concepts that exhibit a distinctive logical form,
they are also expressions of ethical principles and, besides, that they
constitute facts embodied in public attitudes, known by their effects.
That is to say, if we center on the nature of the legal rules themselves (and not on what particularists have said about them) it becomes plain that rules of law comprise, at once, a form of expression,
ethical norms, and a kind of fact. Each of the above three aspects of
law raises many issues which concern the legal scholar and teacher.
A liberal legal education would explore all of these essential phases
of law. It would relate each phase to the others in an effort to make
the total enterprise as significant as possible. This suggests that when
the choice is between information concerning many rules, and imaginative understanding of few rules, the latter is generally preferable.
But this does not mean that quantity must be entirely ignored, or that
practical compromises are inadmissible. For it is in the solution of
such problems that the pedagogic art has its fairest field of operation.
If the foundation of a specific study has been solidly and significantly
laid, that very process will rely upon and differentiate in terms of a
very detailed analysis and in terms of an accompanying and following
hop, skip and jump. When to read the traditional text books is a
very important matter. But organization of materials on the above
principle would need to be attended to far more meticulously than
has been customary.
Since rules of law represent the three essential phases of meaning,
-noted above, the transformation of the study of law into liberal education must proceed in the following principal directions: to the past,
to systematization, to the interrelation of positive law with empirical
knowledge, and to evaluation.
If we confine our study of law to the current meanings of the rules,
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we do not thereby indulge in mere formalism, as is sometimes charged,
but our understanding is much more limited than it need be. We add
an entire dimension to our knowledge if we explore the history of
the present rules. When we seek to understand the nature of anything, we turn, almost spontaneously, to the course of its development, to how it came to be what it is. It is, accordingly, hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that history is greatly neglected in present legal education. We have sought to meet the need by introducing
a single course in legal history, but this only begins to provide the
required knowledge. A liberal legal education would expand historical study considerably. It would do this in many courses, where
the historical materials would be devoted to description of the legal
development in such a manner as to aid understanding of the present
problems. In this regard, the study of history becomes part of the
problem of inter-relating law and social science, and this use of the
historical method will shortly be amplified.
The study of law becomes significant, secondly, in direct, proportion to the degree of systematization achieved-in each subject, and
of the 'Various subjects, themselves. Anyone who urges the importance of logic in legal education encounters a diverse opposition. In
the lack of space to give adequate attention to the various criticisms,
it is possible only to note two important matters which should evoke
general acceptance. We must be reminded, firstly, that every science
seeks the greatest possible generalization, and that this can be achieved
only through a logical ordering of the subject-matfer-indeed, the
two represent an identical progress of the mind. Logic may be a
humble tool, but it clears the path for the flight of the imagination,
it lays the essential ground-work for the discovery of "the one in the
many." Thus if we contrast any highly developed science with a
merely descriptive discipline, we readily see the tremendous gap between the two. Much, perhaps most, of what is distinctive in human
thinking concerns generalization; significance and generalization are
inseparable. If we realize this fully, we may fairly estimate the present status of legal education. This leads to the second matter to be
noted in regard to the role of logic in liberal legal education, namely,
the present disconnectedness of the various courses in the curriculum.
We have long known that the existing curriculum represents a spontaneous adaptation to practical needs. Even if each course with its
present contents were fully defensible, it could not be denied that
little thought has been given to the interrelationship of the various
courses. The needs here are for collaboration in analysis of fields (not
courses) of law, with organization of courses accordingly, and for
courses in jurisprudence that parallel the entire legal curriculum of
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positive law courses. Some part of each year, preferably, of each
term, should be devoted to this over-all job of inter-connecting and
generalization-beginning with an introductory course at the very
outset and culminating in a grand summation of the total enterprise.
The time required for such courses would not be great, and not the
least benesit would be a strengthening of every other course.
But it is the relationships of law to fact and of legal science to
empirical knowledge that raise the most difficult questions of legal
education. 'These problems lie in the very center of current efforts to
improve curricula; it is confusion as to these problems rather than
as regards the expression of objectives, such as liberal legal education,
that is responsible for existing disagreement concerning the basic
methods that are required to attain the accepted goals. We need
therefore to clarify especially the frequently raised questions concerning law and social science, although the following is relevant. to
all emlirical knowledge. To this end, there is no more persuasive
method or one more suited to legal education than that approach
-which views the relevant questions as phases of the problem of language and meaning.
The words of law, like any other words, represent sounds which, in
advanced systems, are symbolized in writing. A sound is a kind of
noise and, in and of itself, has no meaning whatever. It is only when
sounds (symbols) are placed in certain relationships to other things
that they take on meaning. The most obvious kind of meaning results
when the sounds are placed in certain contexts with perceptible factsthe word is obviously something other than the facts to which it is
related. In its association with other facts, the word becomes a pointerat-them; the summoning of the word refers to those facts, and the
reference, in human affairs, is always more or less ambiguous. In a
short-hand expression, we say a certain word "means" certain facts.
For lawmen, the study of cases is the chief avenue to this knowledgehence Langdell, whatever his avowed purpose, should be recognized
as a great pioneer of empirical legal science. For what each case
presents is a set of facts, to which legal rules and principles refer.
These rules take their meanings from the multitude of fact-situations
which they denote. A major effort of the law professor is to improve
upon the vague meanings employed in lay speech, and to explore the
special meanings of terms that are, for good reason or poor, employed
technically. Whether the term is fee-simple, Shelley's Rule, trespasq,
holder in due course, conversion, manslaughter, negligence, acceptance, revocation, or any other of the thousands of terms that comprise rules, of law, the methods of determining their meanings are the
same for all lawyers. They study many configurations composed of
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these terms and other "relevant" facts and, by a process of identification, analogy, inclusion and exclusion, they mark out the areas of
reference, and thus determine meanings.
This kind of exploration can be, and usually is, confined to cases
reported by appellate courts. But the facts involved have no special
affinity for higher courts. Law is potentially all-inclusive, since any
fact that may conceivably affect the .relations of two or more persons
is within the possible area of legal significance. We need, therefore,
to scrutinize "facts" carefully if .weare to grasp the lawyer's prob-lems concerning them. For legal scholars are wont to assume that
"facts" are very simple matters. When they concede the inadequacy
of existing legal education, many of them are apt, rather vaguely, to
ascribe the limitations to lack of facts, and then tW hold that facts
can be accumulated in the college just as well as or better than in
the law school; in any event, that the law schools have no distinctive
task to perform in this regard. This issue lies at the very heart of
the current debates on legal education, and it is necessary to examine
it in some detail-although, it goes without saying, any brief and
simplified rendering of an epistemological problem which has engaged
the most profound of philosophical analyses, bespeaks the indulgence
of the reader.
What must be stressed is that facts presuppose ideas. The simplest
words, accompanied by the exhibition of concrete objects, introduce
ideas on the lowest level of specific description. The words accumulate, and they were related to each other and to the things experienced and symbolized. Thus even a child has an organization of
ideas and a vocabulary, whi.h act as a sieve of brute sensation and
as a means of communication. These ideas function caliper-like to
select and segregate certain clusters of phenomena from the whole
indiscriminate welter, and to give those selected segments meaning
as "facts." In the adult, ideas of wider generality are added; science
and philosophy include many generalizations that are far removed
from immediate sense-experience. Throughout this entire process of
organizing experience, of building the world of a rational being, the
most important feature of it isthe interrelationship of concept and
fact. For present purposes, it may be asserted generally, that the two
are not only inter-connected genetically; but, also, and much more
important, that, if meaningful, they are always interdependent-just
as there can be no "facts in themselves," so concepts apart from facts
are mere verbalisms. Concepts are about facts, they are a way of
dealing with facts.
As noted, the ideas of law are, in part, distinctive ones. But the
rules of law, especially of advanced systems, are also formulated in
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terms that express various degrees of abstraction, denoting more or
less extensive classes. Thus if we say, anyone who violates a contract
must pay damages,'it is necessary to reduce "violates," "contract"
and "damages" to simpler ideas and facts. If we say anyone who
commits burglary will be punished by five years' imprisonment, we
must, to understand "burglary," reduce it to its elements: breaking,
entering, dwelling-house, night-time, intent to commit a felony, and
each of these is defined by placing it in' various contexts of relevant
fact-except the last which is a more complex idea, having reference,
among others, to various terms in the penal code. The legal system
abounds, also, in numerous propositions of relatively great generality, i. e., in principles. The propositions concerning consideration,
negligence, strict liability, and me'ns rea are examples of such more
extensive generalizations. Their immediate reference is to a large
number of rules and, also, to doctrines that occupy an intermediate
area between them. and specific rules of law. On a still higher level
of abstraction are the theories of jurisprudence which refer to the
totality of legal rules.
Most of legal education is concerned with interpretation of the
meanings of these various ideas. But the present endeavor is largely
confined to the facts described in reports of appellate cases. The
isolated cases are "pieced together," the general doctrines and principles that comprise the particular fields of positive law are thus
"induced." Suppose that a law professor, confining himself to traditional case-books, has (1) interpreted. each case, (2) synthesized the
rationes decidendi into doctrines and theories, and (3) drawn at each
step upon his fund of experience and ethical judgment-what more
can and should be done? The probabilities are that he has been most
successful in the formal enterprise of developing general doctrine and
theory-but that, lpari passu, he has failed in constructing .a corresponding body of factual knowledge and ethical principle. The consequent"abstractions, l6gically ordered, lack the vitalizing breath of
infagination because the concepts are significant only to the degree
that they are related to fact and factual knowledge, to ethical judgment and ethics. Lacking thorough inter-relationship in these regards,
they are not barren since they have the support of common-sense and
intuition-but they are relatively superficial and subjective. What
is needed is a solid parallel structure of relevant empirical knowledge
and evaluation.
This takes us from the question of the relations of law to fact to
a consideration of the significance of empirical knowledge and, especially the social disciplines, as aids in the study of law. This question is usually referred to in terms of the relation of "law and social
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science.' But it is clear that this statement of the question reflects
the bias of modern legal positivism. The study of law has rarely been
confined to a study of its logical structure. Long before. the present
social disciplines were established, law faculties were expounding the
ethical principles embodied in law, and they were also exploring their
factual meanings to a limited degree. There has accordingly long been
a "social science in law," 2 a construction, more or less, of commonsense. But the current formulation contains important implications,
namely, that the existing factual knowledge in law is inadequate, and
that improvements can be made by drawing on social science generally.
The legal scholar deals with the incidence of distinctive norms in
social actuality. Ultimately the test of the relevance and utility of
any factual knowledge must therefore be the measure of its significance for the legal problem. Understanding legal problems, in addition to reliance on history and logic, depends upon the creation of a
sociology of law and a legal axiology. These emerging socio-legal disciplines can be described by reference to hon-legal social science. As
regards the methods and techniques of the social sciences-historical,
case-study, questionnaire, interview, statistical, type-analysis, and so
on-it is clear they are all relevant to the construction of the soeiolegal disciplines. The caveat for legal scholars is supplied by the
mountain-high polemics that have characterized the wrangling of
social scientists on "methods." It should be easier, from the present
vantage-point, to use appropriate methods of investigation without
becoming lost in a morass of inferior epistemology.
But the major question concerns the relevance of the content of
the social disciplines for law. In considering this question, we may
begin by recalling the themes that Holmes so eloquently expressed in
terms of "experience" and the "life of the law." Any discussion of
rules of law from this viewpoint inevitably talks a language that is
also of interest to certain non-legal scholars. Once we set rules of
law in contexts of human experience, we find that these social situations comprise the subject-matter of social science or some other
branch of empirical knowledge. If, e. g., we talk about fact-situations
that are significant for the law of contracts (the "operative facts"),
we enter fields of discourse concerned with "free enterprise," "monopoly," the ethics of disappointing expectation, and so on. In torts,
we are unavoidably concerned with the relationships of liability to
2 E.g., the statement of the learned Editor of the Encyclopedia of the Social
Scien es: "Xext to theolog, law was the moving force in the creation of the
mediaeval universities. It was the most significant of the cultural sciences, and its
votaries far outnumbered those devoted to politics or history." I, 4.
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economy, with insurance and other ways of spreading risks. In criminal law, the problems of psychology and morals are obviously met. In
labor law, we confront facts that are significant for labor relations,
modern industry, the nature of the prevailing economic organization,
political rights, and so on. The same is true of every field of law, not
excluding procedure, where logical and psychological problems are
met at every step. These common interests have been widely recognized. The present need is for more precise answers than those usually
given regarding the relationship of legal problems to empirical knowledge, and, especially, to social science. What must be stressed first in
this regard is that it is not correct to assert that the social disciplines
are theoretical, whereas legal science is applied, knowledge. This is
not only unwarranted on any analysis of actual subject-matter, but
it is also misleading in 'suggesting a fallacious simplification of the
problems of inter-relationship. Nor is it adequate to assert that the
essence of legal science is a concern with conflict-situations, even
though that interest obviously exists- other disciplines are also
concerned with conflict, e. g., the economics of competition and the
psychology of aggression. What is distinctive is that legal science
deals with fact-situations affecting public interests, by reference to
which it is feasible and right to apply force in accordance with prescribed norms. If we keep this in mind, we may profitably examine
the social sciences and their relevance to the solution of legal problems.
Instead of considering the social sciences generally, it may relieve
the limitations of extreme brevity, if we confine discussion to economics
and psychology. Within the present narrow purpose, we may say
that economics is a rational science, constructed on premises dealing
-with the allocation of available means to attain limited goods, the
resulting generalizations being interpreted against relevant factual
contexts; or we may say that economics is a descriptive discipline
concerned with certain patterns of institutional behavior. Thus, too,
we may say that psychology is the study of behavioral reactions to
stimuli; or, that psychology is the study of the mind. Thus social
science consists of numerous axioms, descriptions of social phenomena,
and empirical generalizations, more or less organized. We may, nextly,
describe various factual situations that are legally significant, i. e.,
that are "operative" in relation to substantive law. We may, e. g.,
state the operative facts comprising "secondary boycott," and note
the availability of injunctive relief. If we 'wish to understand this
factual situation and the value-judgments involved in the stated
sanction more fully than our common sense or unspeeialized experience permits, we must place it in contexts of social, especially indus-
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trial, relations. These happen to be the subject-matter of labor economics, but labor economists are not chiefly concerned with the relevant distinctive legal questions-whether the legal rule selects and
correctly abstracts on important (i. e., legally significant) factual
situation, whether a secondary boycott ought to be met by the coercion of an injunction, and so on, though they can hardly omit some
effort to understand the effects of the legal institution on industrial
relations. 3 Labor economics deals with the labor market, wage theory,
collective bargaining, labor unions, employers' associations, the effects
of a capitalist economy on industrial relations, the causes of strikes
and boycotts, and the like. The task of the legal scholar is to place
the legally relevant facts constituting "secondary boycott" in the
above context of facts and economic theories. He must clothe his skeleton of the facts with the flesh and blood of the actualities-as labor
economics helps him to do; and he must try to understand the significance of the facts by aid of the economic discipline, which also
facilitates the formation of relevant, defensible value-judgments.
Having completed the economic analysis, he, must face his ultimate
problem, the legal problem, with the increased knowledge of what the
"operative facts" mean, andwhat the prevailing value-judgments,
embodied in the rules, imply. (H'e has, of course, had the legal problem more or less in mind at every step of the economic analysis.)
Whether the fact-situation is takei from contracts or torts, sales,
property, or any other field of law, liberal legal study proceeds from
accretion of operative fact-situationsand preliminary development of
legal doctrine to the construction of the Ofe-situations, the typical
facts of the relevant aspects of social relationships;next, to the understanding of these phenomena by aid of the relevant disciplines,including the over-all criticism of policy; and, ultimately, to the particular
questions of the legal problem-the aptness of the legal definitions
(abstractions from the life-situations), the nature and effects of the
sanctions, evaluation of meeting the type of wrongs under study by
the forms of coercion employed, reformulation of the legal doctrine,.
and final exposition of the legal theories.
Likewise, the legal scholar may begin with fact-situations that com.coercion, "
prise "undue influence," ''mistake," "intention,'
"involuntary confession," or the like. He needs again, as always, to
vitalize the skeletonized, legally defined facts, to transform the accretion of these legally defined situations into actual, fully human be3 Whether we can have an adequate labor economics, or any other adequate
social discipline, that ignores law is not dlisussable here. The reader is referred
to Maitland's criticism of historians who ignore law and legal records, and may
drav his inferences accordingly. I Works 3, 485-6.
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havior, thought and aspiration. The legal rules take on meaning in
this process, partly by enlarging the import of common sense, partly
by aid of the specialized descriptions and theories of psychology. With
each step in this process, we comprehend more fully the distinctive
problems posed by the substantive law-the adequacy of the symbolic
representation, the nature and effect of particular coercive sanctions,
soundness of policy, and so on. Every rule of law in every field of law
is susceptible to receiving increased significance by the above methods
and references. The range of study, as indicated above, would need
to be supplemented by the history of legal doctrine and of the concomitant social and economic organization and policies.
Finally, as indicated, liberal legal education would be concerned,
almost at every step, with questions of policy, since even the simplest
rule of law is the expression of a value-judgment. Adherence to an
atomistic view of law has engendered the theory that law is "negative," that it tells us only what must not be done. But this is to misread the plain implications of any modern legal system, and to confuse the distinctive apparatus by which it functions with the ends
that it seeks to implement. The legal order is constructed upon, and
embodies the ideals of, the civilization it represents. Its distinctive
task is to guide men toward the common ideal by forcibly discouraging conduct in contrary directions. It must accordingly be recognized
that there can hardly be any limitations, other than those of feasibility, resulting from the fact that its methpd is coercive, upon the
range and significance of the value-problem for law and lawyers.
This means, at a minimum, that the prevailing, disconnected ethical
appraisals need to be supplemented by explicit statements of the value
problem, by criticism of conflicting ethical theories, and by persistent
efforts to synthesize the relatively narrow value-judgments derived in
each course. The task for generalization here parallels those concerning legal doctrine and empirical knowledge.
Ill.
No less important than the theory of liberal legal education are the
practical measures that must be taken to attain it. Such practical
problems of education were not beneath the intellectual interest of
Plato, and we need not be impressed by the indifference of those who
may hope to write a few of the footnotes. The writer has elsewhere
digcussed many practical questions related to postwar legal educa-
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tion 4 and the proposals there made can be read in the context of the
above analysis. It is possible to consider here only two practical
problems that directly concern the above discussion of some phases
of liberal legal education.
It will help to present these dialectically. Thus, it may be argued"granted that legal education should be liberal, is not the remedy to
insist on graduation from a good college? If the student enters law
school with a first-rate liberal education, will not his law studies be
pursued imaginatively? Why, therefore, does the objective, liberal
legal education, require major changes?" Certainly the writer would
not deny that well-educated students benefit more from traditional
legal education than do ill-educated ones. But the evidence that
competent college graduates do not normally receive a liberal legal
education is supplied by the limitations of lawyers generally. The
fact is that in the law school they did not construct the necessary
bridges between their technical courses and the non-legal disciplines
they studied in the colleges. Moreover, with notable and increasing
exceptions, their teachers have not provided the necessary materials,
nor have they demonstrated the use of the methods required to attain
that goal. Since legal problems are distinctive, their solutions can not
be found ready-made in the non-legal disciplines. Creative and persevering study is required to discover and formulate the findings and
theories of the non-legal disciplines in terms which render them usable
in analysis of legal problems. Since legal problems are and will remain the ultimate references of the empirical nd normative knowledge that is required for their imaginative study, liberal legal education must grow in and from the law school. This does not imply that
legal subjects -should be studied simultaneously with relevant but not
closely integrated non-legal disciplines-except as a necessary method
of transition to a liberal legal curriculum. Nor does it imply that all
legal studies should be integrated with non-legal disciplines. Such
broad questions, whose very meaning changes in relation to differences
in schools, resources, and other conditions cannot be reliably answered
at present for reasons which the writer has discussed elsewhere.5 But
it must be emphasized, also, that it has been amply proved in certain
limited fields that it is both possible and very profitable to study
some of the results and phases of non-legal disciplines in direct analy4 A 2.2-2 Plan for College-Law Education (1942), 56 Harv. L. R. 245. The plan
there outlined, intended as a transition to, not as a final program of, liberal legal
education, was suggested by a vivid, awareness of the difference between the
formulation of curricula, methods, and aims on paper-and what is required in the
way of personnel, materials, administration, cooperation and effort to reach the
desired objectives.

5Id.
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sis of legal problems. This general question constitutes the chief
methodological problem now confronting legal educators, and until
they are willing to articulate, analyze, and experiment with the methods whereby they hope to achieve their goals, discussion of the relevant practical questions will lack significance.
Another possible criticism might take this quite different direction:
"if the integration of law with non-legal disciplines means a shortening of the time spent in college would not this injure liberal education, might it not accentuate the present vice of narrow vocationalism?" But the very formulation of this argument shows that it
rests on the persistent premise that any legal education inevitably
means technical vocational training. It is not easy to escape this
prevailing bias. The dogma persists that legal study cannot be liberal
education, that we must continue to develop a split personality in
lawyers--one segment of the self reflecting the liberally educated man,
the other containing the technician, the lawyer. It is this myth, this
prevailing false dualism, that must be exploded. In weighing the
validity of the possible claim that improvement of legal education
may be at the expense of liberal education, we need to remember that
because of the prevailing educational compartmentalism, the probability is that, with the passage of time, the college studies of by-gone
days recede farther and deeper into the background of unenjoyed
and unused knowledge. If this learning has been bound firmly to the
legal studies, it would not only have survived, it would have become
a living, growing part of professional practice, an ever-present light
to render any legal service significant. As regards almost every other
calling, the case for liberal college education means something quite
different than it does for lawyers, philosophers and social scientists.
Thus every man should be a good citizen, and he should understand
the elements of science and philosophy, the history of the race and
something of the social institutions of his time, and of the sort of
being man is. But while this is important, cultural education for doctors, engineers and accountants, it is an essential part of the lawyer's
profession. For him the distinction between liberal education and
vocational training is not valid, or, if one prefers, it is least valid.
Hence the challenge is to view his objectives in the large, to take account and advantage of the full six-seven year span, those years of
sensitivity and idealism beyond all others, that he devotes to his entire university education. Even if this is done, the creation of liberal
legal education will assuredly not be in easy task. But educators who
have sensed the untapped potentialities of their students will not be
deterred by the difficulties, nor by the likelihood of failure to reach
the ultimate goal.

